http://evangelicalarminians.org/?q=sea.randal-rauser.Calvinism-Arminianism-and-Omnibenevolence
Arminianslike to point out that according to Calvinism God elects some people todamnation.
Calvinistslike to point that out too. Reprobation isn’t something we’re ashamed of.
Of course some Calvinists try to softenthis teaching by claiming that the election to damnation is a passive divineact according to which God simply “passes over” and thereby opts not to redeemthese people.
Unfortunatelythis shift in nomenclature doesn’t really make the divine act of election todamnation passive in an ethically significant way. Indeed, it calls to mindJames Rachels’ famous thought experiment on passive euthanasia so I’m going toborrow from that thought experiment to make my point.
Imaginethat Bob decides that old Mr. Jones should die. There are two ways Bob couldbring about Mr. Jones’ death.
Scenario 1: Bob drowns Mr.Jones in the bathtub.
Scenario 2: Bob witnessesMr. Jones slip in the bathtub and stands by passively as Mr. Jones drowns.
Scenario1 may result in Bob’s legal culpability in a way that scenario 2 does not(though for regions with a Good Samaritan law Bob may bear some legalculpability in scenario 2 as well). But few will dispute that Bob’s moral culpabilityin Mr. Jones’ drowning is equivalent in scenarios 1 and 2.
When theCalvinist avers that God passes over the reprobate, thereby refusing to imputeto them the righteousness of Christ which will result in their salvation, thedivine withholding parallels Bob’s withholding of life-saving aid to Mr. Jones.Just as God withholds divine aid to result in reprobation so Bob withholdshuman aid to result in death.
But thethought-experiment disregards the fact that Jones is wicked. Even at a merelyhuman level, there are situations in which we have no duty to save someone’slife. Suppose the man who slips in the bathtub is a Mafia Don or malevolentdictator. Suppose he’s an “abortion provider.” Am I under some obligation tosave his life? By saving his life, I will indirectly take the lives of innocentpeople whom he will subsequently murder.
I didn’tcreate the life-threatening situation. But given the situation, that might be agodsend.
At thispoint the Calvinist might raise the following tu quoque objection. “Arminianismfaces a similar problem,” he says. How so? “On the Arminian view God foreknowswho will freely reject him and yet he still elects to create those peopleknowing that they will be reprobated. That isn’t any different.”
Theobjection reveals an important confusion. Let’s say that there are ten people.1-5 are elect and 6-10 are reprobate. On the Calvinist view God could haveelected all to salvation but opted not to. In other words, on the Calvinistview there is a possible world in which 1-10 are elect. But God opted not tocreate that world.
Thingsare very different on the Arminian view. On this view there may be no possibleworld in which 1-10 are elect because there is no possible world in which 1-10repent. That’s an important difference.
Butstill, the Calvinist does have a point, doesn’t he? Why didn’t God just createa world with 1-5 so that everybody would be elect? The problem with thatsuggestion is this: there is no reason to think that 1-5 would all be elect ina world where only 1-5 exist.
Let’ssay, for example, that in the actual world Smith is reprobate and Smith Jr. iselect. Could God create a world in which Smith doesn’t exist but Smith Jr.does? Let’s assume that he can. Still, does it follow that in that alternate world(or, more specifically, in that subset of worlds in which Smith doesn’t existbut Smith Jr. does) that Smith Jr. is elect? This doesn’t follow. It may indeedbe the case that in every possible world in which 1-5 exist but 6-10 do notthat not all of 1-5 are elect.
Inconclusion, the Calvinistic view deals a heavy blow to any doctrine ofomnibenevolence and consequently faces a unique problem not faced by theArminian.
i) Firstof all, Rauser hasn’t given us any tangible reason to think that out of all the gazillionsof possible worlds, there’s not a single world in which everyone freelybelieves in God. Why should we think that’s a plausible scenario?
ii) Andif it only “may” be the case that there is no such world, then it “may” equallybe the case that there is one or more such worlds. So why does Rauser lay somuch weight on a guess?
iii) Inany event, Rauser’s comparison fails on its own terms. For he framed thecomparison in terms of divine “omnibenevolence.” But if the Arminian Godknowingly creates a world in which some people will be damned, then he’s notbeing benevolent to them.
However,let’s go back to the original post, which includes some of Rauser’s comments:
BeforeGod creates he surveys the range of possible worlds which have people whofreely repent and he opts to create one of those worlds which achieves asoptimal a balance of saved over loss as is possible.
But inthat case, the Arminian God is not omnibenevolent. For he’s not benevolent tothe lost. He’s not acting in their best interests. To the contrary, he’sharming them. He has sacrificed their welfare for the benefit of the saved. Onthat view, God is utilitarian rather than omnibenevolent.
This issimply a description of transworld depravity…
Whatpositive evidence is there to think transworld depravity is real?
I don'tthink that God could have achieved the goods he wants to achieve without theevil of hell (i.e. some creatures in rebellion against him). If he could haveachieved that good without hell he surely would have.
But inthat case, God’s goals conflict with omnibenevolence, and his goals takeprecedence over omnibenevolence. The Arminian God achieves the goods he wantsto achieve at the expense of the damned. His goals override their wellbeing. Hesquashes anyone who gets in the way of his goals. His goods aren’t good forthem. His goods are bad for them.
I'm anannihilationist. That means I believe in a general resurrection to a judgmentthat culminates in the complete destruction of the unregenerate individual(i.e. "capital punishment).
How isannihilationism omnibenevolent? Rauser may think it’s nicer than everlastingpunishment, but that doesn’t make it omnibenevolent in its own right.
If Godis omnibenevolent, why does he need to punish anyone? Why would anomnibenevolent God punish unbelievers for being unbelievers? Why destroy themjust because they reject him? How is that benevolent? Why not let them continueto exist on their own in some part of the universe?
If Godis omnibenevolent, wouldn’t remedial punishment be the only type of punishmenthe metes out? Punishment intended to help rather than harm?
Sowhat’s the point of annihilationism? It’s not remedial punishment. Seemspurely vindictive from the standpoint of someone who espouses omnibenevolence.
Hiç yorum yok:
Yorum Gönder